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CASENOTES
Foreign Sovereigns as Private Antitrust Plaintiffs: Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India ' —The governments of three foreign nations, 3
 as purchasers of antibi-
otics, instituted separate antitrust actions against six United States pharmaceuti-
cal companies.' The alleged violations included price-fixing and monopoliza-
tion in the sale of broad spectrum antibiotics, 4
 in violation of sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.' The plaintiffs sought treble damages under section 4
of the Clayton Act, which provides a cause of action to lalny person who
shall be injured in his person or property" by a violation of the antitrust
laws.' The cases were subsequently consolidated for trial in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota.'
The drug companies moved for dismissal on the ground that the respon-
dents, as foreign nations, were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble dam-
ages under section 4. 8
 The district court denied the motion, holding that
foreign nations are "persons" for purposes of section 4, and are therefore
' 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
2
 The plaintiffs were the Government of India, the Imperial Government of
Iran, and the Republic of the Philippines. 434 U.S. at 309. Vietnam was a party in the
court of appeals and a respondent in the petition for certiorari. The district court
subsequently dismissed Vietnam's complaint, however, on the ground that the United
States no longer recognized Vietnam. The dismissal was affirmed by the court of ap-
peals. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 1977). Suits
were also brought by Columbia, West Germany, South Korea, Spain, and Kuwait. The
latter three nations have subsequently withdrawn their suits. 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
950, 950 n.1 (1978).
3
 The firms were Pfizer, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Bristol-Meyers
Company, Squibb Corporation, Olin Corporation, and the Upjohn Company. Pfizer,
Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 396 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976). The cases were
part of the massive litigation known as the Antibiotics Cases, which have involved over
160 plaintiffs. Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. I, 1 & n.4
(1975).
4
 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. at 301.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
6
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), provides in full:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
7
 434 U.S. at 309. The cases were originally brought in the Southern District
of New York before Judge Lord of the District of Minnesota, sitting by assignment. See
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 534 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
judge Lord transferred the cases for trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). 456
F.2c1 at 534. The transfer was approved by the court of appeals. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,
447 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1971).
8
 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1975). The definition of
the word "person" as used in the Clayton Act is given in 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976):
The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act shall be
deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or au-
thorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the
Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
411
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entitled to institute treble damage suits." On interlocutory appeal," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision," and then adhered to its affirmance upon rehearing en
banc. 12 The circuit court found nothing in either the language or the legisla-
tive history of the antitrust laws which indicates that Congress intended to
prohibit. foreign nations from seeking private remedies under the Clayton
Act.'"
The Supreme Court, in a five to three decision," affirmed the Eighth
Circuit's decision and HELD: Foreign nations otherwise entitled to sue in
United States courts are "persons" under section 4 of the Clayton Act, and
may therefore institute antitrust suits for treble damages. 15 Finding no
specific authority for its decision in either the language or the legislative his-
tory of the Clayton Act," the Pfizer Court based its holding on its interpreta-
tion of prior case law, and on the general policies underlying the antitrust
laws.' 7 The significance of the Pfizer decision lies in its expansion of the class
of antitrust plaintiffs beyond those parties clearly set out in the Clayton Act.
The decision to make available the treble damage provisions of the Clayton
Act to some 160 sovereign nations," many of which buy enormous quantities
of American goods, may have a great impact on United States corporations
" Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Pfizer, Inc.
v. Government of India, 550 F.2(1 396, 396-97 (8th Cir. 1976). The district court relied
on an earlier decision in a related case holding that the State of Kuwait was a "person"
under section 4. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). In the Kuwait ruling, the district court found that the real question was
"whether the maintenance of this action is essential to the effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws." Id. at 316. The district court decided that the result orientation ap-
proach to the antitrust laws dictated that foreign nations should have status as "per-
sons," in order that violators would he more fully liable. Id. at 316-17. See 434 U.S. at
311 11.5.
A corporation wholly owned by the government of India appeared as a plaintiff in
the Electric Equipment Antitrust Cases in the early 1960's. "Preliminary motions to
dismiss plaintiffs for lack of standing were filed, argued, and denied." Velvel, supra
note 3, at 1 n.3. However, the cases were settled before trial. Id. Apparently, the An-
tibiotics Cases were the first trials involving whether foreign sovereigns are "persons."
Id. Consequently, the literature on the question is extremely limited.
t" The interlocutory appeal was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976),
which allows a district court judge to recommend an appeal on an order not otherwise
appealable if in his opinion the appeal will "materially advance" the litigation. The
court of appeals may then, in its discretion, hear the appeal.
Pfizer, inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1976).
12 Id. at 400.
13 14. The circuit court felt that the situation was more similar to that in Geor-
gia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), holding that domestic states would be allowed to sue
under § 4, than to the situation in United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941),
denying the right to sue to the United States Government. 550 F.2d at 398-99.
14 The opinion was written by Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger dissented, joined by Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Powell also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
18
 434 U.S. at 320.
'" 14. at 311-13.
" Id. at 313-20.
18 Id. at 330 11.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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and on the economy. In addition, the decision reaffirms both the broad re-
medial nature of the antitrust laws and the Court's active role in enforcement
of those laws.
This casenote will first examine the rationale employed by the Pfizer
Court in extending private antitrust remedies to foreign sovereigns. The
statutory language, legislative history, prior case law, and policy considerations
will then be discussed in an effort to assess the merits of the majority's deci-
sion. It will be submitted that allowing foreign nations to institute treble dam-
age actions will strengthen the enforcement of the antitrust laws in foreign
commerce, in accordance with antitrust policy. It will further be suggested
that, despite the dissent's desire to defer to Congress, the Pfizer Court reached
the proper decision.
I. THE PFIZER DECISION
In determining whether a foreign government is a "person" under the
Clayton and Sherman Acts, and therefore entitled to sue for treble damages
in United States courts, the Pfizer Court first observed that "Where is no
statutory provision or legislative history that provides a clear answer ...." '"
The Court noted that foreign nations are not specifically included in the
statutory definition of "person." 20 The Court maintained, however, that
Congress did not intend that the word "person" be given a restrictive defini-
tion. 2 ' Therefore, the Court examined "Whe purpose, the subject matter,
the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the stat-
ute" to determine whether the statute nevertheless is applicable to foreign
governments. 22
The Pfizer Court postulated that foreign nations "possess two attributes
that could arguably exclude them from the scope of the sweeping phrase 'any
person,' but considered neither attribute to be a compelling reason for
exclusion. In examining the first attribute—foreign status, the Court noted
that foreign corporations are included in the statutory definition of "per-
son" 24
 and that the antitrust laws extend to trade with foreign nations. 25
 In
view of this express concern with foreign commerce, the Court reasoned,
"Congress did not intend to make the treble damages remedy available only to
19 Id. at 312.
29 Id. at 312 n.9. For the statutory definition of "person," see note 8 supra.
21 Id. at 312.
22 Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605
(1941)).
23 434 U.S. at 313.
24
 Section 1 of the Clayton Act states that the word "person" will "he deemed
to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
... any foreign country." 15 U.S.C. 12 (1976).
23 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act both Forbid anticompetitive acts in
"commerce „ . with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C.
	 1, 2 (1976). Section I of the
Clayton Act covers "commerce with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. 12 (1976). For a
discussion of the foreign application of the antitrust laws, see Kintner & Griffin, Juris-
diction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. IND. & Cosi. L.
REV. 199 (1977).
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consumers in our own country." 	 Furthermore, the Court explained that
extending private antitrust remedies to foreign sovereigns may actually con-
tribute to the protection offered American consumers." Such remedies
promote the general policies underlying the antitrust laws by denying vio-
lators the fruits of their conduct, by compensating victims of unlawful con-
duct, and by deterring future violations." Thus, the Court concluded, to
preserve the overall effectiveness of the antitrust laws, foreign nations should
be allowed to bring suit."
The Court next determined that the second attribute of foreign
nations—sovereign status—also should not prevent them from pursuing an-
titrust remedies. 3 ° In so deciding, the Court rejected the defendants' conten-
tion that Congress intended by the use of the word "person" to exclude
sovereign governments. Rather, the Court found that the word "person" does
not have a fixed meaning, nor did it at the time the antitrust laws were
enacted.31 In order to define the scope of that statutory term, the majority
examined two earlier Supreme Court cases construing the word "person" as
used in the Clayton Act. 32
The first case examined by the Pfizer Court. was United States v. Cooper
Corp:" In Cooper, the United States sued to recover treble damages for over-
charges on items it had purchased from the defendants. 34 The Cooper Court
denied recovery, holding that the United States is not a "person" under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act and therefore cannot pursue private antitrust rem-
edies. 35 The Pfizer Court pointed out, however, that Cooper did not estab-
lish a mechanical rule that all sovereigns are excluded from the definition of
"person." 36 Rather, the Pfizer majority explained, the Cooper Court rested its
decision on the fact that separate and distinct antitrust remedies are specifi-
cally reserved for the United States, and on legislative history indicating that
"Congress affirmatively intended to exclude the United States" from private
antitrust remedies. 37 By contrast, neither alternative remedies nor specific
legislative history exists with regard to foreign nations. On this basis, the Pfizer
Court found Cooper distinguisable."
The second case which the Court examined was Georgia v. Evans, 39 in
which the state of Georgia attempted to recover under the Clayton Act for
26
 434 U.S. at 313-14.
27 Id. at 319. The Court noted that denial of the right to sue would provide
violators with funds to offset liability to domestic consumers. Id. at 315.
26 Id. at 319-15.
29 See id. at 313-15.
39 Id. at 315-19.
3L Id. at 315 & n.15.
32 United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 60{) (1941); Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 (1942).
33 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
34 Id. at 603-04.
35 Id. at 614.
36
 434 U.S. at 316-17.
37 Id. The other remedies noted in Cooper included criminal prosecutions, in-
junctions, and seizure of property. Id. at 317.
39 Id. at 316-18.
39 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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alleged overcharges on quantities of asphalt which it had purchased." The
Evans Court held that domestic states are "persons" entitled to institute pri-
vate suits under the antitrust laws.'" In so holding, the Court distinguished
its earlier decision in Cooper on the ground that state governments, in contrast
to the federal government, do not have access to separate and distinct anti-
trust remedies. 42 The Evans Court therefore concluded that Congress in-
tended state governments to pursue private remedies under section 4."
From its examination of Evans, the Pfizer Court concluded that the word
"person" as used in the antitrust laws does not automatically exclude all
sovereign governments." Analogizing to Evans, the Court reasoned that
foreign sovereigns are in much the same position as state governments since
they have no separate and distinct remedies available under the antitrust
laws." Using the very words of Evans, the Pfizer Court stated that it could
"perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a [foreign
nation] ... of the civil remedy of treble damages which is available to other
purchasers who suffer through violation of the Act.""
Thus, although the Court could find nothing in either the express lan-
guage or the legislative history of the antitrust laws which dictated the result
in Pfizer, it concluded that foreign sovereigns should not be denied access to
private antitrust remedies. The Court based its decision on the broad reme-
dial purpose which Congress intended the antitrust laws to serve, 47 and, in
this regard, the Court was guided by its own prior constructions of the word
"person" in Cooper and Evans. The Court concluded its Pfizer opinion by not-
ing that the decision to allow foreign nations to sue was "no more than a
specific application of a long-settled general rule." 48 Foreign nations are
generally allowed access to our courts "to prosecute any civil claim ... upon
the same basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do,"" and, the
majority reasoned, denial of an antitrust remedy to them would be an unjus-
tified exception when there was no clear expression of congressional intent to
exclude them. 50
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissented
in Pfizer, arguing that the issue presented involved major policy considerations
whose resolution should be left to Congress. 5 t The dissent began by examin-
ing the Clayton Act and the definition of the word "person" therein, and
found no evidence, express or implied, of a congressional intention to allow
foreign nations to sue. 52 In contrast to the specific inclusion of foreign
4" Id. at 160.
41 Id. at 162 -63.
42 Id. This was the same reasoning the Pfizer Court used to distinguish Cooper.
See text at notes 37-38 supra.
" 316 U.S. at 162-63.
44 434 U.S. at 317-18.
45
 Id. at 318.
4" Id. (quoting Evans, 316 U.S. at 162-63).
47 Id. at 314-18.
48
	at 319.,
49 Id. at 318-19.
5 " Id. at 319.
5 ' Id. at 320-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52 Id, at 321-24.
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corporations as "persons," 53
 the dissent noted, foreign nations are not men-
tioned. 54
 The dissent reasoned that the failure to specifically include foreign
nations indicates a congressional intent to exclude them from the provisions
of section 4. 55
 Thus, any action to include foreign sovereigns within the def-
inition of "persons" should be taken by Congress, not the Court. 5 "
In addition to attacking the majority's construction of the statutory lan-
guage, Chief Justice Burger took issue with the Court's conclusion that Con-
gress, in encompassing commerce with foreign nations within the scope of the
antitrust laws, intended to include foreign nations within the definition of
"persons." 57
 The dissent contended that "congressional concern with the
foreign commerce of the United States does not entail either a desire to pro-
tect foreign nations or a willingness to allow them to sue Americans for treble
damages in our courts." 58
 Quite the contrary, the dissent argued, the focus
of the Sherman Act's concern with foreign commerce is to protect domestic
consumers of imported goods." Finding no indication in the legislative his-
tory that Congress even considered the question whether foreign sovereigns
are "persons" under the antitrust laws," the dissent stated that the question
should be left "to the same political process that gave birth to the Sherman
and Clayton Acts." tit The absence of any express intention to exclude
foreign nations is not, according to the dissent, sufficient reason to justify
allowance of such suits.'
Finally, the dissent disputed the Court's reliance on Georgia v. Evans, 63
distinguishing Evans on the basis of "cogent" differences between domestic
states and foreign nations." The dissent first noted that while domestic
states are not expressly included as antitrust plaintiffs, their parens patriae rela-
tionship to United States citizeins justifies extending private remedies to them
53 For the statutory definition of "person," see note 8 supra.
54
 434 U.S. at 321-24. The dissent pointed out that foreign sovereigns, in
terms of their immunity from suit, were in a different position from that of foreign
corporations at the time of passage of both the Sherman and the Clayton Acts, Id. at
322. The dissent therefore reasoned that
[Oven that 'person' as used in the Clayton and Sherman Acts refers to
both antitrust plaintiffs and defendants ... the decision of Congress to
include foreign corporations while omitting foreign sovereigns from the def-
inition most likely reflects this differential susceptibility to suit rather than
any intent to benefit foreign consumers or to enlist their help in enforcing
our antitrust laws.
Id. (emphasis in original).
55 Id. at 321-22.
56 Id. at 322-23.
57 Id. at 323.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 324.
6° Id. at 324-25. The majority agreed with the dissent's evaluation of the legis-
lative history, stating that "it seems apparent that the question was never considered at
the time the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted." Id. at 312.
61 Id. at 325.
62 Id.
" 316 U.S. 159 (1942); see note 39 supra.




since it fulfills the congressional purpose to protect American consumers."'
The same argument would not apply to foreign states, since the benefits
would flow to foreign rather than to United States citizens. A second consid-
eration of the dissent in distinguishing Evans was that foreign nations may
themselves enact effective antitrust legislation while states are constrained
from so doing by the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses." Furthermore,
stated the dissent, "it takes little imagination to realize the dramatic and very
real differences in terms of coercive economic power and political interests
which distinguish our own States from foreign sovereigns." " 7 For the dissent,
therefore, Evans did not mandate a decision expanding the definition of "per-
son" to include foreign nations." 8 Thus, on the basis of its examination of
the language, legislative history, and prior case law interpreting section 4, the
dissent concluded that the decision whether to allow foreign nations to sue for
treble damages required the resolution of important policy considerations
which should be deferred to Congress."
II. ANALYSIS OF PFIZER'S FOREIGN SOVEREIGN INCLUSION
A. Statutory and Legislative Basis for Inclusion
In spite of the dissent's objections, it is submitted that the Pfizer Court
was on solid ground in concluding that the failure of Congress to specifically
include foreign sovereigns in the statutory definition of "person" is not dis-
positive of whether foreign sovereigns may sue for treble damages under the
antitrust laws. A number of arguments, based both upon the statutory lan-
guage and upon the overall policy of the antitrust laws, may be made indicat-
ing a congressional intent to include foreign nations as antitrust plaintiffs.
One such argument is based directly on the statutory language. As the Pfizer
Court pointed out, "Congress used the phrase 'any person' intending it to
have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning."'" Moreover, the Court has
previously noted that when a statutory definition contains the verb "include,"
as does the definition of the word "person" under the antitrust laws, it. "im-
ports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in
the definition."' Since Congress used the broad phrase "any person" and
since "include" is interpreted as giving certain examples rather than all in-
stances, it is suggested that Congress intended that foreign nations be in-
cluded within the scope of the word "person."
This broad interpretation of the statutory definition is supported by con-
gressional amendments subsequent to the enactment of the antitrust laws. On
several occasions when the Court has restricted the definition of "person" in
"5 Id. at 326.
"" Id. at 326-27. West Germany was given as an example of a country having
strong antitrust laws. Id. at 327.
"7 Id. The dissent noted the price-fixing and boycotts of the Middle East na-
tions as examples of the greater power available to foreign states. Id. at 327-28.
"8 Id. at 328.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 312.
" Helvering v. Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.l (1934). For the statutory
definition of "person," see note 8 supra.
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applying the antitrust laws, 72
 Congress has acted to reverse the decisions. For
example, after the Court held that domestic states could not sue for injunctive
relief under the antitrust laws," Congress enacted section 16 of the Clayton
Act, giving states and private parties the right to injunctive relief." A second
example of legislative reversal occurred after the Court held in Cooper that the
United States could not be a plaintiff in a treble damage suit. 75 In 1955
Congress enacted section 4A of the Clayton Act, which allows the United
States to sue for actual damages. 75 These reversals indicate that Congress
does not want the antitrust laws interpreted restrictively."
Congressional intention for a broad reading of the word "person" is also
indicated by the fact that Congress did not act to legislatively overrule deci-
sions allowing suits by foreign nations in other contexts. Several unfair com-
petition suits, 78
 which are similar to antitrust actions, were brought by foreign
nations after passage of the Sherman Act but prior to enactment of the
Clayton Act:79
 Vet Congress, when enacting the Clayton Act, did not change
the definition of "person" to exclude foreign nations. Thus, it may be argued
that foreign nations were understood to be included.
72 Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904) (domestic states could
not sue for injunctive relief); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941)
(United States was not a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages).
" Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904).
' 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that la)ny
person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief ...."
75
 312 U.S. at 614.
" 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976). As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, section 4A
provides only for the recovery of actual damages by the United States, rather than the
treble damages available to other plaintiffs. 434 U.S. at 328 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, this distinction does not weaken the persuasiveness of the amendment as
evidence that the definition of "person" should be read broadly. The difference in
damages awarded to the United States was due to the fact that the treble damage
award was seen as necessary to encourage suit. Since "Mlle United States is, of course,
charged by law with the enforcement of the antitrust laws ... it would be wholly im-
proper to write into the statute a provision whose chief purpose is to promote the
institution of proceedings." S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1955
U.S. Com:
 CONC. & AD. NEWS 2328, 2330. The Senate Report specifically states that
the amendment was introduced for the purpose of providing the United States with
the relief denied by the Court in Cooper. Id.
" Since the Pfizer decision, three Senate bills have been introduced which
would change the position of foreign nations under the Clayton Act. Senator Thur-
mond introduced S. 2395, which would limit foreign nations to actual damages. 124
CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978). S. 2724, introduced by Senator Inouye,
would only allow suits by foreign nations allowing reciprocal access to the United
States. 124 CONG. REC. 53455 (daily ed. March 10, 1978). The Final bill, S. 2486, intro-
duced by Senator DeConcini, would both limit recovery to actual damages and require
reciprocal access. 124 CONG, REC. S1189 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1978). The bills have been
referred to the judiciary Committee. It is interesting to note that, while all three bills
would modify the right of foreign sovereigns to recover damages, none of the bills
would overrule the Pfizer Court's determination that foreign sovereigns are "persons"
for purposes of the antitrust laws.
78 E.g., French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903).
7 " Velvel, supra note 3, at 18.
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More positively, it must be recognized that Congress intended the anti-
trust laws to apply to foreign commerce." If foreign nations were not al-
lowed to sue, a significant portion of foreign commerce would not be subject
to the antitrust laws. Thus, it would seem that Congress intended the inclu-
sion of foreign nations when it enacted such a comprehensive statute. Addi-
tional support for this proposition is found in the specific inclusion of foreign
corporations. 8 ' Since the inclusion is without restriction, corporations or-
ganized and controlled by foreign sovereigns would seemingly be allowed to
sue. 82
 Therefore, an exclusion of foreign sovereigns would bar treble dam-
age suits only where the sovereign has not incorporated its purchasing func-
tions.83
 Proponents have suggested that this is another indication of a con-
gressional intent to include foreign nations as persons under section 4."
While there are several arguments supporting the view that Congress did
not intend foreign sovereigns to be included as "persons," they are not persua-
sive. It may be argued, for example, that since Congress was primarily con-
cerned with protecting domestic consumers, 85 it did not intend to extend the
right to sue under the Clayton Act to foreign sovereigns. 86 This argument
does not give sufficient weight, however, to the fact that the antitrust laws do
encompass foreign commerce." Furthermore, even where the violations do
not directly affect American consumers, violations directly affecting foreign
consumers may indirectly affect domestic price levels." Therefore, a primary
congressional concern with domestic consumers does not preclude the conclu-
sion that the statute also is intended to protect foreign sovereigns participat-
ing in commerce.
Another argument that Congress intended to exclude foreign sovereigns
from private antitrust remedies is based on the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity." At the time the antitrust laws were enacted, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity prevented foreign sovereigns from being sued in the courts of the
United States." Since the definition of "person" in section 4 applies to both
plaintiffs and defendants, this argument proceeds, Congress could not have
intended to include foreign sovereigns as plaintiffs, because they could not be
defendants. Nonetheless, one year after the decision in Evans that domestic
s° See note 25 supra.
81 See note 24 supra.
82 See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); 5 VAND, J. TRANSNAT'l, L. 531, 534 (1972).
83
 If government-owned corporations were barred from suit, there would re-
main the question of how much government involvement would be necessary before
the bar operated. Velvel, supra note 3, at 20 n.81.
84' Id. at 20.
" See 434 U.S. at 324 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86 Id.
87 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951)
(Sherman Act "prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of foreign trade"). See
note 25 supra.
88 See Rahl, A Rejoinder, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 42, 43 (1974).
" See 434 U.S. at 322 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
9 " See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-47
(1812); cf. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 570-76 (1926) (holding
that a ship owned and operated by a foreign sovereign is immune from private suit).
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states are "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages," the Supreme Court
held that a state is immune to private antitrust suits for restraints on trade
established under its legislative authority." Consequently, despite their
sovereign immunity as defendants, domestic states can still act as plaintiffs in
antitrust suits. 93
 Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not necessar-
ily bar protected sovereigns from instituting antitrust actions as plaintiffs, 94
and this argument is therefore not persuasive of a congressional intent to bar
foreign sovereigns from the protection of the antitrust laws.
Although the above statutory and legislative arguments provide some
support for the Pfizer Court's decision, they are not, by themselves, a conclu-
sive basis for including foreign nations as "persons" under section 4. Further
support for the Court's decision, however, can be drawn from its previous
interpretations of section 4.
B. 'Prior Supreme Court Decisions
The issue facing the Supreme Court in Pfizer was one of first impression.
Neither of the two previous cases dealing with the effect of sovereign status
on access to private remedies under section 4 was directly controlling in Pfizer.
Cooper was distinguishable since Congress had already provided the United
States separate and distinct remedies under the antitrust laws. 95
 Evans was
also distinguishable because of Congress' concern for protecting domestic con-
sumers and because of the close relationship states have to such consumers. 96
Despite the differences between domestic states and foreign nations,
Evans appears closer to the situation in Pfizer than does Cooper. In general
terms, Evans established that sovereigns are not necessarily barred from com-
mencing antitrust suits." Evans was based, in large part, on the lack of alter-
native federal antitrust remedies for states." While it is true that foreign
nations generally have more economic power and flexibility to counter anti-
trust violations than do domestic states, they are in a position similar to
domestic states as far as lacking other remedies under the antitrust laws. 99
The Cooper Court, in contrast, based its decision to exclude the United States
from the definition of "person" on the other remedies available to the United
States, as well as on specific legislative history indicating a congressional intent
to exclude the United States from the treble damages remedy.'" Therefore,
it would appear that the Pfizer Court was correct in placing principal reliance
91 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
92 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
93 Id. at 351.
94
 Velvel, supra note 3, at 21-22.
95 See 434 U.S. at 318.
98
 434 U.S. at 325-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
97
 316 U.S. at 161.
98 Id. at 162-63.
99
 Encouraging foreign nations to use their retaliatory power to control anti-
trust violations would tend to be disruptive of international commerce. Velvel, supra
note 3, at 10. Also, the Pfizer Court noted that retaliation is not practicable in a situa-
tion where a nation is "faced with monopolistic control of the supply of medicines
needed for the health and safety of its people." 434 U.S. at 318 n.18.
100 See text at note 37 supra.
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on Evans in deciding to extend private antitrust remedies to foreign
sovereigns.
C. Policy Considerations
In reaching its decision to include foreign nations as "persons" under
section 4, the Pfizer Court also relied on the policies underlying the antitrust
laws. It is suggested that the Pfizer Court's decision is particularly appropriate
in light of those policies. Congress enacted the antitrust laws in order to pre-
serve competition."' "[T]he vast majority of congressmen were sincere
proponents of a private enterprise system founded on the principle of 'full
and free competition. 102 Competition was considered necessary and desir-
able to maintain a free society."' The Supreme Court has recognized this
underlying policy over a long history of enforcement of the antitrust laws. As
the Court has stated, the lalmitrust laws ... are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important. to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedom."'" Accordingly, the Court has consistently
recognized that the means by which Congress has chosen to preserve
economic freedom is by fostering competition through the application of the
antitrust laws.'us
The private treble damage actions authorized by section 4 of the Clayton
Act occupy an increasingly important position in the statutory scheme de-
signed to foster competition. While in the early years of antitrust enforcement.
government suits were more frequent than private suits, the pattern has been
changing since World War II. Today, private suits outnumber government
suits by a factor of ten.' As one commentator has stated, the existence of
the right to a private action "automatically puts a host of interested and well
informed persons in the enforcement force.', 107
 Thus, in terms of numbers
alone, private actions help to fight antitrust violations in a way that the gov-
ernment could not do without a large increase in staff.
"" H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLicv, at 226-32 (1955).
"2 Id. at 226.
1 " Loevinger, Antitrust, Economics and Politics, I ANTITRUST BuLL. 225, 227-30
(1955). For a discussion of the economic theory of the period and its development, see
THORELLI, .supra note 101, at 1-232.
1 " United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
"5 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). In United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge Learned
Hand stated:
True, it might have been thought adequate to condemn only those
monopolies which could not show that they had exercised the highest pos-
sible ingenuity, had adopted every possible economy, had anticipated every
conceivable improvement, stimulated every possible demand.... Be that as
it may, that was not the way that Congress chose; it did not condone 'good
trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbad all.
Id. at 427.
"" Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809, 809 n.1 (1977).
107 Loevinger, Private Actions —The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167, 168 (1958).
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In addition to enforcement, private actions serve two other goals of the
antitrust laws—deterrence and compensation. The treble damages awarded a
private plaintiff generally are more effective as a deterrent than the threat of
criminal prosecution, fines, and injunctions under government actions." 8 Pri-
vate damages also compensate the victims of the violations, which government
actions, essentially punitive in nature, cannot.'° 9
 Thus, private treble damage
actions play a dominant role in implementing a strong antitrust policy.'
Recognizing the importance of effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court has interpreted them broadly. As the Court has
noted, antitrust legislation "has a generality and adaptability comparable to
that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." '" The Court has
also stated that the Clayton Act is "comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices. t, 112 Determi-
nation of the antitrust statutes' applicability in a particular case thus depends
not on a "strict construction," but, on consideration of "[t]he purpose, the sub-
ject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpreta-
tion." " ' The courts have tended to "liberalize traditional doctrines and
statutory interpretations" " 4
 which would otherwise bar relief. This judicial
attitude has aided the development of the private action into a strong weapon
for antitrust enforcement.
The Court's decision in Pfizer is consistent with a strong antitrust policy
since it increases the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. Trade with foreign
nations constitutes a significant portion of United States commerce. Allowing
treble damage suits by foreign nations will provide a large number of poten-
tial plaintiffs to enforce the antitrust laws. Conversely, denying foreign gov-
ernments the right. to sue could lessen the deterrent effect of private actions.
In the absence of a cause of action for foreign nations, antitrust violators
dealing exclusively with foreign sovereigns "would retain the fruits of their
illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against them." "5
"8 Id. at 168-69. •
"9 Id. at 168.
110 The Court has recognized this role, describing the private actions as creating
a group of "private attorneys general" to increase enforcement. Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). As the Court has stated, "the purposes of the
antitrust laws are best served by ensuring that the private actions will be an ever-
present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the
antitrust laws." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968). in addition to noting this important deterrent effect, the Court has em-
phasized the compensatory function of the private actions. See Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977).
'" Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
12 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948). Even in a case where the Court restricted the right of indirect purchasers
to maintain an action, it did so on the basis that suits by direct purchasers will be more
effective and will often compensate the injured party. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977).
"" United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941).
'" Berger & Bernstein, supra note 106, at 809 n.l.
'" Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)
(refusal to allow as defense that plaintiff had passed on the illegal overcharge since the
violator might thereby escape liability).
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Even if other, non-sovereign foreign purchasers were involved, so that some
part of any illegal gain would be recoverable, the sovereign is most likely in
the best position to effectively litigate a suit in the United States."' In any
event, allowance of direct suits by foreign sovereigns should further the policy
of maximizing the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws." 7
The Pfizer decision should also result, under the economic theory on
which the antitrust laws are based,'" in increased competition in foreign
commerce. This increased competition should provide benefits for the Ameri-
can economy, both by increasing exports and by lowering domestic prices."e
In contrast, as one commentator has noted, "[i]t seems clear that a rule pro-
hibiting treble damage suits by foreign sovereigns would not only fail to pro-
mote the economic goals furthered by the antitrust laws, but it would run
contrary to them and could have an overall detrimental impact upon the
domestic American economy.' , I 20 Thus, the Court's decision should benefit
foreign commerce and, ultimately, the domestic consumer.
It may be argued that increasing potential liability of American corpora-
tions may have harmful effects on the American economy by removing money
from the country. However, this argument ignores both the fundamental im-
portance of competition as a policy underlying the antitrust laws and the
principle that increasing competition will benefit the economy."' Moreover,
only a failure to comply with the antitrust laws in dealing with foreign nations
will result in liability. The harm thus results only from violations of the estab-
lished policy of free competition. 122 Therefore, the argument that the poten-
tial harm to the American economy should suspend the normal operation of
the antitrust laws is not a strong one.
Diplomatic considerations also favor the Pfizer Court's decision. Allowance
of suits by foreign sovereigns will eliminate the resentment foreign nations
would feel if unable to recover for the same type of violations for which
'" See Velvel, supra note 3, at 32.
17 See text and notes 101-05 supra.
1 " See text at notes 101-05 supra.
19 434 U.S. at 315. Competition should result in lower world market prices,
which have an impact on domestic prices and the cost of imports. See Velvel, supra
note 3, at 7.
129 Velvel, supra note 3, at 7. The author discusses a number of ways in which
unpunished anticompetitive practices in foreign commerce may increase domestic in-
flation, such as the influence of United States export prices on world trade and
thereby on domestic price levels, the discouragement of competitive prices on foreign
goods imported into the United States, and the creation of "war chests" for defending
against domestic antitrust suits. Id. at 7-8. The Court also discussed these economic
arguments. 434 U.S. at 314-15. See text at notes 26-29 supra.
12 ' The Wehb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976), provides for an excep-
tion to the application of the antitrust laws in a limited area of foreign commerce by
joint associations. The limited nature of the exceptions provides an argument against
the idea that competition is normally seen as undesirable in the area of foreign com-
merce.
122 In any event, the potential harm to the American economy is to some extent
illusory, since much of the recovery by a foreign nation may be spent in the United
States, either in normal business transactions or by judicial decree. Velvel, supra note 3,
at 15-16.
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United States consumers can recover.'" Also, granting the right to sue aids
and gives credence to efforts by the United States to establish antitrust policies
among the nations of the world. 124 A failure to grant the right would cast
doubt on the seriousness of these efforts. Furthermore, the Court has stressed
that, under principles of comity, foreign governments should be permitted to
bring claims in United States courts. 125 Denial of the right may lead to a
retaliatory denial of access for the United States to foreign courts, 12 " and to
possible harm to foreign relations.127 Therefore, in addition to furthering
antitrust policies, the Court's decision may further international relationships.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above considerations, it is submitted that the Pfizer Court's
decision to extend treble damage remedies to foreign sovereigns is a sound
one. The statutory and legal authority before the Court, while providing some
indication of a congressional intent to include foreign nations as "persons"
under section 4, did not provide a strong basis for decision. The Court prop-
erly turned, therefore, to an examination of the policy considerations behind
the antitrust laws. The Court's decision accords well with those policy consid-
erations, since it will result in stronger enforcement of the laws against an-
ticompetitive conduct. Given the broad scope of those laws and the position of
the Court as both interpreter and enforcer of them, the Court's action to
extend the permissible class of plaintiffs rather than to defer decision to Con-
gress was proper.
WILLIAM B. SIMMONS, JR.
' 23 Id. at 9.
124 see, e.g., the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C. §,§ 286 to 286k-I
(1976), which urges that measures be taken "which will reduce obstacles to and restric-
tions upon international trade." 22 U.S.C. § 286k (1976). For a discussion of efforts to
deal with antitrust violations on an international level, sec Joelson, "International Anti-
trust": A Look Al Recent Developments, 12 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 565, 578-79 (1971).
' 25 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sahbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-12 (1964) (right
to sue was extended even to an unfriendly nation).
126 Velvel, supra note 3, at 9-10.
127 See Note, The Capacity of Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private Federal Antitrust
Actions, 9 CORNELL INT'''. L.J. 137, 152 (1975). Denial of the suits may adversely affect
treaty relationships. Id. at 152 n.68. See, e.g., Treaty with Iran on Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, [1957] 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
